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I think a good share of the time when someone states that the DoS may "possibly" lead to remote code execution are making such a statement for a couple different reasons:
I do not think the evidence quickly available to us would bring us to conclude most DoS's end up resulting in remote code execution -- or even have the ability to. I would agree saying "often enough" would be better than "most."
However, regardless of whether it results in remote code execution, I don't think a DoS should necessarily be discounted as frivolous or irrelevant. It might not rank up there with critical or high vulnerabilities, but it is a vulnerability nonetheless.
> Ok 'most' is probably bad wording on my part how does 'often enough' sound
> "Buffer overflow in the png_decompress_chunk function in pngrutil.c in
> libpng before 1.2.12 allows context-dependent attackers to cause a
> denial of service and possibly execute arbitrary code"
> "Buffer overflow in efingerd 1.5 and earlier, and possibly up to 1.61,
> allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service and possibly
> execute arbitrary code via a finger request from an IP address with a
> long hostname that is obtained via a reverse DNS lookup."
> "A BrightStor ARCserve Backup contains four
> vulnerabilities that can allow a remote attacker to cause a denial
> of service or possibly execute arbitrary code."
> Note the use of 'possibly'. If it was possible then 'possibly' wouldn't be
> I'm not going to debate the validity of the month of activex bugs because
> frankly I don't care, merely
> that a DOS can turn out to be more and that at times either the researcher
> hasn't spent enough time on it, can't get the POC working, or lacks the
> skill to fully understand the problem.
> There have been multiple instances on the securityfocus lists throughout
> the years where a DOS suddenly
> became promoted to a remotely exploitable bug (i.e another person found it
> was actually exploitable). I'm not going
> to find them and post them here, but a little googling can yield
> - Robert
>> >>Consider that most often a bug filed as DOS can actually be
>> exploitable, but the person who discovered it can't get the POC working
>> or is even aware it is. While command execution is the ideal goal it
>> doesn't mean other types of issues are *completely* worthless. =20
>> Most often? How do you know that?
>> Larry Seltzer
>> eWEEK.com Security Center Editor
>> Contributing Editor, PC Magazine
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