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[Full-disclosure] CORE-2009-0401 - StoneTrip S3DPlayers remote command injection

From: CORE Security Technologies Advisories <advisories_at_nospam>
Date: Thu May 28 2009 - 19:04:02 GMT
To: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk, bugtraq <bugtraq@securityfocus.com>

Hash: SHA1 Core Security Technologies - CoreLabs Advisory http://www.coresecurity.com/corelabs/ StoneTrip S3DPlayers remote command injection

  1. *Advisory Information*

Title: StoneTrip S3DPlayers remote command injection Advisory ID: CORE-2009-0401
Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/content/StoneTrip-S3DPlayers Date published: 2009-05-28
Date of last update: 2009-05-28
Vendors contacted: StoneTrip
Release mode: User release

2. *Vulnerability Information*

Class: Command injection, Client side
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
Bugtraq ID: 35105
CVE Name: CVE-2009-1792

3. *Vulnerability Description*

Ston3D is a cross-platform technology developed by StoneTrip [1], allowing applications developed with ShiVa product [2] to be run from various media. It is a platform for 3D real time development, specially designed to make games and other real time applications.

Ston3D players come in two flavors:

  1. Ston3D StandalonePlayer [3],
  2. and Ston3D WebPlayer [4], which runs like an extension or plug-in within most popular web browsers.

These players are vulnerable to a command injection vulnerability, which can be exploited by malicious remote attackers. The vulnerability is due to the Ston3D scripting language. It provides the function 'system.openURL()' which does not properly sanitize the input before using it. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the Stone3D player by opening a specially crafted file.

4. *Vulnerable packages*

4.1. *Win32* . S3DPlayer Web v1.6.0.0 . S3DPlayer StandAlone v1.6.2.4 . S3DPlayer StandAlone v1.7.0.1

4.2. *MacOS*

   . S3DPlayer Web v1.6.0.0
   . S3DPlayer StandAlone v1.6.2.4

4.3. *Linux*

   . S3DPlayer StandAlone v1.6.2.4

NOTE: Older versions are probably affected too, but they were not checked.

5. *Non-vulnerable packages*

By the time this advisory was published, the vendor:

  1. had not released patched versions of its products,
  2. had not answered the requests made by Core Security for 3 weeks (see Section 9).

Please contact StoneTrip for a fix.

6. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*

The vendor did not provide this information. A possible mitigation action would be to enable MIME type filtering in your IDS/proxies and block S3DPlayer traffic:


- -----------/

As a workaround, vulnerable users can also avoid this flaw by disabling the Ston3D Plugin in their web browsers:

6.1. *Mozilla Firefox*

  1. Go to the *Tools* menu, and select *Options...*
  2. Click on the *Main* tab
  3. Click on the *Manage Add-ons...*
  4. Disable *Ston3D Plugin*

6.2. *Safari*

  1. Go to the *Safari* menu within Safari, and select *Preferences*
  2. Click on the *Security * tab
  3. Deselect *Enable plug-ins*

6.3. *Internet Explorer*

Set the kill bit for control 7508D2BB-F085-45BF-8261-167C6DF4D477 (as explained in http://support.microsoft.com/kb/240797).

Please contact StoneTrip for further information, patches and workarounds.

7. *Credits*

This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Diego Juarez from Core Security Technologies.

8. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*

Ston3D is a cross-platform technology allowing applications developed with ShiVa product [2] to be run from various media, such as a website, CD/DVD or interactive equipment. This technology provides a scripting interface [5] based on the Lua programming language, within this interface the function 'system.openURL' is defined as follows:


system.openURL(sURL, sTarget) --Call this function to open an URL.

  • -----------/

In the current implementation, the call 'system.openURL(sURL, sTarget)' with the parameter 'sURL' set as 'file://path/command' will ultimately execute the equivalent of calling

system("open path/command");
- -----------/

 By using platform specific delimiter characters this could allow arbitrary code execution in the context of the player.

Find below the relevant code snippets from various platforms.

8.1. *Windows*

/----------- .text:1000D64D test esi, esi .text:1000D64F mov eax, esi .text:1000D651 jnz short loc_1000D658 .text:1000D653 .text:1000D653 loc_1000D653: ; CODE XREF: Pandora::ClientCore::HTTPConnectionManager::OpenURL(Pandora::EngineCore::String const &amp;,Pandora::EngineCore::String const &amp;)+1CB .text:1000D653 mov eax, offset Name .text:1000D658 .text:1000D658 loc_1000D658: ; CODE XREF: Pandora::ClientCore::HTTPConnectionManager::OpenURL(Pandora::EngineCore::String const &amp;,Pandora::EngineCore::String const &amp;)+1D1 .text:1000D658 push 1 .text:1000D65A push offset Name ; lpDirectory .text:1000D65F push ecx ; lpParameters .text:1000D660 push eax ; lpFile .text:1000D661 push offset Operation ; "open" .text:1000D666 push 0 ; hwnd .text:1000D668 call ds:ShellExecuteA .text:1000D66E .text:1000D66E loc_1000D66E: ; CODE XREF: Pandora::ClientCore::HTTPConnectionManager::OpenURL(Pandora::EngineCore::String const &amp;,Pandora::EngineCore::String const &amp;)+1B0 .text:1000D66E test edi, edi .text:1000D670 jbe short loc_1000D67F .text:1000D672 test esi, esi .text:1000D674 jz short loc_1000D67F .text:1000D676 add esi, 0FFFFFFFCh .text:1000D679 push esi ; Memory .text:1000D67A call ebp ; __imp_free

  • -----------/

8.2. *Linux*

/----------- .text:08371334 mov [esp+5Ch+var_58], offset aOpen ; "open " .text:0837133C lea eax, [esp+5Ch+var_34] .text:08371340 mov [esp+5Ch+command], eax .text:08371343 call sub_8109FC0 .text:08371348 lea eax, [esp+5Ch+var_1C] .text:0837134C mov [esp+5Ch+var_58], eax .text:08371350 lea eax, [esp+5Ch+var_34] .text:08371354 mov [esp+5Ch+command], eax .text:08371357 call sub_8108F10 .text:0837135C lea eax, [esp+5Ch+var_34] .text:08371360 mov [esp+5Ch+command], eax .text:08371363 call sub_80DF660 .text:08371368 mov [esp+5Ch+command], eax .text:0837136B call _system .text:08371370 lea eax, [esp+5Ch+var_34] .text:08371374 mov [esp+5Ch+command], eax .text:08371377 call sub_80D92F0 .text:0837137C jmp short loc_8371398

  • -----------/

8.3. *MacOSX (x86)*


__text:0005995B lea eax, (aOpen - 597ECh)[ebx] ; "open "
__text:00059961 lea esi, [esp+5Ch+var_44]
__text:00059965 mov [esp+5Ch+var_58], eax
__text:00059969 mov [esp+5Ch+var_5C], esi
__text:0005996C call __ZN7Pandora10EngineCore6StringC1EPKc ;
Pandora::EngineCore::String::String(char const*)
__text:00059971 mov [esp+5Ch+var_58], edi
__text:00059975 mov [esp+5Ch+var_5C], esi
__text:00059978 call __ZN7Pandora10EngineCore6StringpLERKS1_
__text:0005997D mov edx, [esp+5Ch+var_44]
__text:00059981 test edx, edx
__text:00059983 jz loc_59A5F
__text:00059989 mov eax, [esp+5Ch+var_40]
__text:0005998D test eax, eax
__text:0005998F jz loc_59A5F
__text:00059995 loc_59995: ; CODE XREF:
Pandora::ClientCore::HTTPConnectionManager::OpenURL(Pandora::EngineCore::String  const&amp;,Pandora::EngineCore::String const&amp;)+295
__text:00059995 mov [esp+5Ch+var_5C], eax
__text:00059998 call _system
__text:0005999D mov eax, [esp+5Ch+var_44]
__text:000599A1 test eax, eax
__text:000599A3 jnz loc_59AB2
__text:000599A9 nop dword ptr [eax+00000000h]

  • -----------/

8.4. *MacOSX (PPC)*


__text:00053D6C addi %r30, %sp, 0x90+var_38
__text:00053D70 addis %r4, %r31, 0x3F
__text:00053D74 addi %r4, %r4, -0x29DC
__text:00053D78 mr %r3, %r30
__text:00053D7C bl __ZN7Pandora10EngineCore6StringC1EPKc #
Pandora::EngineCore::String::String(char const*)
__text:00053D80 mr %r3, %r30
__text:00053D84 mr %r4, %r29
__text:00053D88 bl __ZN7Pandora10EngineCore6StringpLERKS1_
__text:00053D8C lwz %r0, 0x90+var_38(%sp)
__text:00053D90 cmpwi cr7, %r0, 0
__text:00053D94 beq cr7, loc_53DA4
__text:00053D98 lwz %r3, 0x90+var_34(%sp)
__text:00053D9C cmpwi cr7, %r3, 0
__text:00053DA0 bc 5, 4*cr7+eq, loc_53DAC
__text:00053DA4 loc_53DA4: # CODE XREF:
Pandora::ClientCore::HTTPConnectionManager::OpenURL(Pandora::EngineCore::String  const&amp;,Pandora::EngineCore::String const&amp;)+394
__text:00053DA4 addis %rtoc, %r31, 0x3F
__text:00053DA8 addi %r3, %rtoc, -0x5620
__text:00053DAC loc_53DAC: # CODE XREF:
Pandora::ClientCore::HTTPConnectionManager::OpenURL(Pandora::EngineCore::String  const&amp;,Pandora::EngineCore::String const&amp;)+3A0
__text:00053DAC bl _system
__text:00053DB0 lwz %r0, 0x90+var_38(%sp)
__text:00053DB4 cmpwi cr7, %r0, 0
__text:00053DB8 beq cr7, loc_53E24
__text:00053DBC b loc_53DF8

  • -----------/ 9. *Report Timeline*

. 2009-04-20:
Core Security Technologies notifies the StoneTrip team of the vulnerability and announces its initial plan to publish the content on May 18th, 2009.

. 2009-04-21:
The vendor asks Core for a technical description of the vulnerability.

. 2009-04-23:
Technical details sent to StoneTrip team by Core.

. 2009-04-24:
In addition to the technical details, a Proof of Concept was sent to StoneTrip team.

. 2009-04-28:
Core asks the vendor to confirm the reception of the technical report.

. 2009-04-28:
StoneTrip team notifies that the technical report has been received and that a vulnerability report will be sent to Core soon.

. 2009-05-07:
Core requests a status update for this vulnerability and notifies its plan to publish the advisory on May 18th, 2009. No reply received.

. 2009-05-15:
Core requests an answer to the previous mail. No reply received.

. 2009-05-18:
Core Advisories Team does not release the advisory as originally planned. Core re-schedules the advisory publication date to 26th May 2009.

. 2009-05-20:
Core notifies StoneTrip that the advisory publication date was missed and that the last status requests were not replied. Core also notifies the vendor of the final release date (26th May 2009).

. 2009-05-28:
After trying to contact the StoneTrip team several times without success, the advisory CORE-2009-0401 is published as 'User Release'.

  1. *References*

[1] http://www.stonetrip.com.
[2] ShiVa, a platform for 3D real time development with focus in game development
http://www.stonetrip.com/shiva/shiva-3d-game-engine.html. [3] http://www.stonetrip.com/ston3d-players/ston3d-standalone.html. [4] http://www.stonetrip.com/ston3d-players/ston3d-webplayer.html. [5] http://stdn.stonetrip.com.

  1. *About CoreLabs*

CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: http://www.coresecurity.com/corelabs.

  1. *About Core Security Technologies*

Core Security Technologies develops strategic solutions that help security-conscious organizations worldwide develop and maintain a proactive process for securing their networks. The company's flagship product, CORE IMPACT, is the most comprehensive product for performing enterprise security assurance testing. CORE IMPACT evaluates network, endpoint and end-user vulnerabilities and identifies what resources are exposed. It enables organizations to determine if current security investments are detecting and preventing attacks. Core Security Technologies augments its leading technology solution with world-class security consulting services, including penetration testing and software security auditing. Based in Boston, MA and Buenos Aires, Argentina, Core Security Technologies can be reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web at http://www.coresecurity.com.

  1. *Disclaimer*

The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2009 Core Security Technologies and (c) 2009 CoreLabs, and may be distributed freely provided that no fee is charged for this distribution and proper credit is given.

  1. *PGP/GPG Keys*

This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org


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