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Quoting Eric Paris (firstname.lastname@example.org):
> Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use audit to
> make an A or B type decision instead of a security decision. Currently
> this is the case at least for filesystems when deciding if a process can use
> the reserved 'root' blocks and for the case of things like the oom
> algorithm determining if processes are root processes and should be less
> likely to be killed. These types of security system requests should not be
> audited or logged since they are not really security decisions. It would be
> possible to solve this problem like the vm_enough_memory security check did
> by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into that
> interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide complex
> This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and to not
> flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not security decisions.
> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <email@example.com>
Please introduce some meaningful defines instead of passing 0 and 1. I.e.
#define CAP_NOAUDIT 0
#define CAP_AUDIT 1
Otherwise, looks fine.
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