linux-kernel May 2008 archive
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SubjectAuthorDate
Re: [PATCH BUGFIX -rc4] Smack: Respect 'unlabeled' netlabel modePaul Moore
Re: [patch 01/15] security: pass path to inode_createTetsuo Handa
Re: [patch 01/15] security: pass path to inode_createChristoph Hellwig
Re: [PATCH BUGFIX -rc4] Smack: Respect 'unlabeled' netlabel modeCasey Schaufler
Re: [patch 00/15] security: pass path instead of inode to security opsTetsuo Handa
Re: [PATCH BUGFIX -v2 -rc4] Smack: Respect 'unlabeled' netlabel modeAhmed S. Darwish
Re: [PATCH BUGFIX -rc4] Smack: Respect 'unlabeled' netlabel modeAhmed S. Darwish
Re: [PATCH BUGFIX -v2 -rc4] Smack: Respect 'unlabeled' netlabel modeCasey Schaufler
Re: [PATCH BUGFIX -v2 -rc4] Smack: Respect 'unlabeled' netlabel modeAndrew Morton
Re: [PATCH BUGFIX -rc4] Smack: Respect 'unlabeled' netlabel modeCasey Schaufler
Re: [PATCH BUGFIX -v2 -rc4] Smack: Respect 'unlabeled' netlabel modeTetsuo Handa
[PATCH BUGFIX -v2 -rc4] Smack: Respect 'unlabeled' netlabel modeAhmed S. Darwish
[PATCH BUGFIX -rc4] Smack: Respect 'unlabeled' netlabel modeAhmed S. Darwish
Re: [patch 00/15] security: pass path instead of inode to security opsMiklos Szeredi
Re: [patch 00/15] security: pass path instead of inode to security opsTetsuo Handa
[patch 14/15] vfs: more path_permission() conversionsMiklos Szeredi
[patch 12/15] security: pass path to inode_setxattrMiklos Szeredi
[patch 13/15] security: pass path to inode_removexattrMiklos Szeredi
[patch 03/15] security: pass path to inode_mkdirMiklos Szeredi
[patch 11/15] security: pass path to inode_listxattrMiklos Szeredi
[patch 01/15] security: pass path to inode_createMiklos Szeredi
[patch 09/15] security: pass path to inode_setattrMiklos Szeredi
[patch 15/15] security: pass path to inode_permissionMiklos Szeredi
[patch 02/15] security: pass path to inode_mknodMiklos Szeredi
[patch 10/15] security: pass path to inode_getxattrMiklos Szeredi
[patch 05/15] security: pass path to inode_unlinkMiklos Szeredi
[patch 08/15] security: pass path to inode_renameMiklos Szeredi
[patch 07/15] security: pass path to inode_linkMiklos Szeredi
[patch 06/15] security: pass path to inode_symlinkMiklos Szeredi
[patch 04/15] security: pass path to inode_rmdirMiklos Szeredi
[patch 00/15] security: pass path instead of inode to security opsMiklos Szeredi
Re: [PATCH] security: was "Re: capget() overflows buffers."Andrew Morton
Re: [PATCH] security: was "Re: capget() overflows buffers."Chris Wright
Re: Bug/misfeature of "securityfs"Markku Savela
Re: Bug/misfeature of "securityfs"Markku Savela
Re: Bug/misfeature of "securityfs"Greg KH
[PATCH] security: was "Re: capget() overflows buffers."Andrew G. Morgan
Re: Bug/misfeature of "securityfs"James Morris
Re: capget() overflows buffers.Chris Wright
Re: capget() overflows buffers.Chris Wright
Re: capget() overflows buffers.Andrew G. Morgan
Re: capget() overflows buffers.Andrew G. Morgan
Re: capget() overflows buffers.Chris Wright
Re: capget() overflows buffers.Andrew G. Morgan
Re: capget() overflows buffers.Chris Wright
Re: capget() overflows buffers.Chris Wright
Re: capget() overflows buffers.Andrew G. Morgan
Re: [PATCH] fix sys_prctl() returned uninitialized valueSerge E. Hallyn
Re: [PATCH] security: protect legacy apps from insufficient privilegeAndrew G. Morgan
Re: [PATCH] fix sys_prctl() returned uninitialized valueAndrew G. Morgan
Re: [PATCH] security: protect legacy apps from insufficient privilegeAndrew Morton
Re: [PATCH] fix sys_prctl() returned uninitialized valueAndrew Morton
Re: [PATCH] security: protect legacy apps from insufficient privilegeAndrew G. Morgan
Re: [PATCH] fix sys_prctl() returned uninitialized valueAndrew Morton
Re: [PATCH] fix sys_prctl() returned uninitialized valueAndrew G. Morgan
Re: [LTP] [PATCH] fix sys_prctl() returned uninitialized valueAndrew Morton
Re: [LTP] [PATCH] fix sys_prctl() returned uninitialized valueLi Zefan
Re: [PATCH] fix sys_prctl() returned uninitialized valueAndrew Morton
[PATCH] fix sys_prctl() returned uninitialized valueShi Weihua
Re: [PATCH] capabilities: fix sys_prctl() returned uninitialized valueShi Weihua
Re: [PATCH] security: protect legacy apps from insufficient privilegeSerge E. Hallyn
[PATCH] security: protect legacy apps from insufficient privilegeAndrew G. Morgan
Re: [PATCH] capabilities: fix sys_prctl() returned uninitialized valueSerge E. Hallyn
[PATCH] capabilities: fix sys_prctl() returned uninitialized valueShi Weihua
Re: LSM: MAINTAINERS points to no longer existing URLChris Wright
Re: LSM: MAINTAINERS points to no longer existing URLStephen Smalley
Re: [PATCH] security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attachJames Morris
Re: [PATCH] security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attachChris Wright
Re: LSM: MAINTAINERS points to no longer existing URLChris Wright
LSM: MAINTAINERS points to no longer existing URLAdrian Bunk
[PATCH] security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attachStephen Smalley
Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attachStephen Smalley
Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attachSerge E. Hallyn
Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attachCasey Schaufler
[RFC][PATCH v2] security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attachStephen Smalley
Re: [PATCH 0/3] exporting capability name/code pairs (for 2.6.26)KaiGai Kohei
Re: [PATCH 0/3] exporting capability name/code pairs (for 2.6.26)Andrew Morgan
Re: [RFC][PATCH] security: split ptrace checking in procChris Wright
Re: [RFC][PATCH] security: split ptrace checking in procStephen Smalley
Re: [RFC][PATCH] security: split ptrace checking in procChris Wright
Re: [RFC][PATCH] security: split ptrace checking in procStephen Smalley
Re: [RFC][PATCH] security: split ptrace checking in procChris Wright
Re: [PATCH 0/3] exporting capability name/code pairs (for 2.6.26)KaiGai Kohei
Re: [PATCH 0/3] exporting capability name/code pairs (for 2.6.26)Chris Wright
Re: [PATCH 0/3] exporting capability name/code pairs (for 2.6.26)KaiGai Kohei
Re: [PATCH 0/3] exporting capability name/code pairs (for 2.6.26)KaiGai Kohei
Re: [PATCH 0/3] exporting capability name/code pairs (for 2.6.26)Alexey Dobriyan
Re: [RFC][PATCH] security: split ptrace checking in procStephen Smalley
Re: [RFC][PATCH] security: split ptrace checking in procStephen Smalley
Re: [RFC][PATCH] security: split ptrace checking in procCasey Schaufler
[RFC][PATCH] security: split ptrace checking in procStephen Smalley
Re: [TOMOYO #8 (2.6.25-mm1) 1/7] Introduce new LSM hooks.Tetsuo Handa
Re: [PATCH] capabilities: add bounding set to /proc/self/statusAndrew Morton
Re: [PATCH] capabilities: add bounding set to /proc/self/statusMichael Kerrisk
Re: [PATCH] capabilities: add bounding set to /proc/self/statusChris Wright
Re: [PATCH] capabilities: add bounding set to /proc/self/statusAndrew G. Morgan
[PATCH] capabilities: add bounding set to /proc/self/statusSerge E. Hallyn
Re: [TOMOYO #8 (2.6.25-mm1) 1/7] Introduce new LSM hooks.Stephen Smalley
Re: [TOMOYO #8 (2.6.25-mm1) 1/7] Introduce new LSM hooks.Chris Wright
Re: [TOMOYO #8 (2.6.25-mm1) 1/7] Introduce new LSM hooks.Stephen Smalley
Re: [TOMOYO #8 (2.6.25-mm1) 1/7] Introduce new LSM hooks.Tetsuo Handa