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* [2011-03-08 07:59:43 +1100] Damien Miller wrote:
>On Mon, 7 Mar 2011, Vincent Danen wrote:
>> * [2011-03-06 09:00:47 +1100] Damien Miller wrote:
>> > The attack is on the client by a malicious server - a client can't DoS
>> > a server with this bug. We generally don't put much effort into making
>> > the client resilient to DoS from a hostile server.
>> I'm confused. Why would this be an attack on the client? The client is
>> the one putting the glob (the server isn't pushing this as far as I can
>> see). I do see a CPU spike (and blocking on the ability to execute any
>> subsequent commands) on the client, but I also see (excessive?) CPU
>> usage on the host.
>Sorry, I was incorrect above - the attack is purely client end. If there
>is additional CPU usage on the server then it is just from the client
>issuing more requests.
That makes sense. Thanks.
>> Interestingly, subsequent sftp connections to the host, doing the same
>> thing do not increase CPU usage significantly.
>> Is this something you would be interested in disputing with MITRE over
>> the CVE assignment?
>Feel free to forward this email conversation. I don't understand why they
>don't contact the vendor to verify CVEs to begin with.
I think it simply has to do with volume (I suspect it isn't feasible to
try to initiate contact with all upstream vendors considering how much
they have to deal with).
>> I see you also said:
>> > actually, the CVE description is nonsensical. sftp-server doesn't
>> > process globs in requests at all. All glob expansion is done by
>> > the client.
>> > So a user entering a malicious glob is DoSing their own end of the
>> > connection.
>> Doing further testing, I'm inclined to agree with you. At best this is
>> a client DoS, but they are doing it to themselves (but you implied
>> malicious server above, so I'm not sure whether this should be
>> considered a flaw from a malicious server and the description needs to
>> be revised, or if this should be rejected outright since self-inflicted
>> issues shouldn't really be considered security flaws).
>Here's a simple proof:
>[djm@mothra openssh]$ grep -l 'glob[(]' *.c
>There are no glob calls in the server, so it can't be vulnerable to
>malicious glob patterns.
Perfect. Thanks, Damien. I'm going to summarize this in our bug and
then point it to MITRE (as well as this thread) so that it can be
-- Vincent Danen / Red Hat Security Response Team _______________________________________________ openssh-unix-dev mailing list firstname.lastname@example.org https://lists.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev