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This is a slippery slope. I'm in favor of not having a CVE assigned
for this issue.
Otherwise, wouldn't we need a CVE for every vector that allows
transitioning from various capabilities to root? The capability
system may be poorly designed to allow such transitions, but I don't
think they represent unexpected behavior.
On Thu, Jan 6, 2011 at 12:54 PM, Michael Gilbert
> On Thu, 06 Jan 2011 13:20:49 +0800, Eugene Teo wrote:
>> re: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2011/Jan/39
>> Just in case someone tries to request a CVE name for this, I'm not
>> requesting for one because if you need CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability to
>> exploit this, you are already privileged.
> Right, but CAP_SYS_ADMIN != root, or at least it isn't meant to be. I
> mean if CAP_SYS_ADMIN == root, then one or the other doesn't need to
> exist. There is an exposure here, and for that it deserves a CVE
> identifier (of course in my opinion). See Brad Spengler's recent
> write-up . There should be some effort toward making those 21 root
> equivalent capabilities discussed there non-equivalent.
> Best wishes,
>  http://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=2522