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* [2011-09-25 19:22:19 +0200] Pierre Joye wrote:
>On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 6:38 PM, Rasmus Lerdorf <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
>> are we talking about the tiny number of people who have explicitly
>> enabled allow_url_include and are running the code with this bad autoloader?
>Yes, and that's why it is a very very minor problem. However it was
>not happening before the code change. The few cases where the class
>names&co have been sanitize before and the developer did not think
>about cases like the one describe in the blog post. I think it is even
>more rare combination, but it was not happening before our change.
Thanks for all the discussion around this.
Pierre has it right... prior to the change, whether it was intended or
not, documented or not, PHP did things a certain way and users could
(for better or worse) rely on a certain behaviour to do "the right
thing" (right in the context of their application, even if it is wrong
in the context of writing good PHP code). 5.3.7 changed that, which
left applications that used this "feature" in a vulnerable state.
It's unfortunate for everyone that PHP gets so many CVEs assigned to it
for trivial little things. I look at every CVE assigned for safemode
or open_basedir bypass flaws... technically speaking, I would never
consider those to be flaws because those functions are not meant to be
sandboxing features or high security features, as outlined on PHP's
page, however they do get CVEs assigned.
Even though PHP does not consider those features to be security
protection features, CVEs are still assigned. You would expect that
most people would not rely on those features as security features, which
means those "bypass" flaws should never really affect people in a
security context, but the sad reality is that they do. CVE does not
distinguish between good programming habits or bad ones. Flaws like
this, that are only exposed due to bad programming in applications,
still end up with CVEs assigned at the language level.
I don't think those CVEs reflect poorly on PHP -- I think most people
who know PHP, realize that people do dumb stuff and that a language like
PHP makes it easier to do dumb stuff.
In this case, I think this particular issue is more worthy of a CVE than
the open_basedir/safemode-related CVEs (and there are _lots_ of those).
-- Vincent Danen / Red Hat Security Response Team