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The TUN driver lacks any LSM hooks which makes it difficult for LSM modules,
such as SELinux, to enforce access controls on network traffic generated by
TUN users; this is particularly problematic for virtualization apps such as
QEMU and KVM. This patch adds three new LSM hooks designed to control the
creation and attachment of TUN devices, the hooks are:
diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c
index 027f7ab..f26c1fe 100644
--- a/drivers/net/tun.c
+++ b/drivers/net/tun.c
@@ -130,28 +130,22 @@ static inline struct tun_sock *tun_sk(struct sock *sk)
static int tun_attach(struct tun_struct *tun, struct file *file)
{
struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
- const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- int err;
+ int err = 0;
ASSERT_RTNL();
- /* Check permissions */
- if (((tun->owner != -1 && cred->euid != tun->owner) ||
- (tun->group != -1 && !in_egroup_p(tun->group))) &&
- !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
-
netif_tx_lock_bh(tun->dev);
- err = -EINVAL;
- if (tfile->tun)
+ if (tfile->tun) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
+ }
- err = -EBUSY;
- if (tun->tfile)
+ if (tun->tfile) {
+ err = -EBUSY;
goto out;
+ }
- err = 0;
tfile->tun = tun;
tun->tfile = tfile;
dev_hold(tun->dev);
@@ -922,6 +916,7 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
struct sock *sk;
struct tun_struct *tun;
struct net_device *dev;
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int err;
dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifr->ifr_name);
@@ -935,6 +930,13 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
else
return -EINVAL;
+ if ((tun->owner != -1 && cred->euid != tun->owner) ||
+ (tun->group != -1 && !in_egroup_p(tun->group)))
+ return -EPERM;
+ err = security_tun_dev_attach(tun->sk);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
err = tun_attach(tun, file);
if (err < 0)
return err;
@@ -943,10 +945,9 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
char *name;
unsigned long flags = 0;
- err = -EINVAL;
-
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
+ err = security_tun_dev_create();
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
/* Set dev type */
if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN) {
@@ -957,8 +958,10 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
/* TAP device */
flags |= TUN_TAP_DEV;
name = "tap%d";
- } else
+ } else {
+ err = -EINVAL;
goto failed;
+ }
if (*ifr->ifr_name)
name = ifr->ifr_name;
@@ -989,6 +992,8 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
tun->sk = sk;
container_of(sk, struct tun_sock, sk)->tun = tun;
+ security_tun_dev_post_create(sk);
+
tun_net_init(dev);
if (strchr(dev->name, '%')) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 5eff459..67f5d91 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -91,6 +91,9 @@ struct seq_file;
extern int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
extern int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
+extern int cap_tun_dev_create(void);
+extern int cap_tun_dev_attach(void);
+
extern unsigned long mmap_min_addr;
/*
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -2557,6 +2574,9 @@ void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req);
void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb);
+int security_tun_dev_create(void);
+void security_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *tun_sk);
+int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *tun_sk);
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
static inline int security_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
@@ -2707,6 +2727,20 @@ static inline void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
}
+
+static inline int security_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+ return cap_tun_dev_create();
+}
+
+static inline void security_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *tun_sk)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *tun_sk)
+{
+ return cap_tun_dev_attach();
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 48b7e02..07125a6 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -984,3 +984,29 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
}
+
+/**
+ * cap_tun_dev_create - Determine if creation of a new TUN device is allowed
+ *
+ * Determine if the user is allowed to create a new TUN device, historically
+ * this has always required the CAP_NET_ADMIN permission.
+ */
+int cap_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cap_tun_dev_attach - Determine if attaching to an TUN device is allowed
+ *
+ * Determine if the user is allowed to attach to an existing persistent TUN
+ * device, historically this has always required the CAP_NET_ADMIN permission.
+ */
+int cap_tun_dev_attach(void)
+{
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index dc7674f..14ebf82 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1112,6 +1112,24 @@ void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
security_ops->inet_conn_established(sk, skb);
}
+int security_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+ return security_ops->tun_dev_create();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
+
+void security_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *tun_sk)
+{
+ return security_ops->tun_dev_post_create(tun_sk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_post_create);
+
+int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *tun_sk)
+{
+ return security_ops->tun_dev_attach(tun_sk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
+
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
--
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