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On Thu, 28 Oct 2010 12:43:51 -0400
> On 10/28, David F. Skoll wrote:
> > Perhaps you have heard of a recent phenomenon called "a botnet"?
> > Just what security do you think TCP really buys you?
> Requiring them to use the botnet.
In other words: No security at all.
> > And what kind of account registration do you envision that lets you
> > easily register "millions" of accounts?
> Free. Unrestricted.
That's completely at odds with your remarks below that you don't
expect scaling to be an issue.
It will also make your data practically worthless.
> > That's why I think it's folly to accept IP reputation submissions
> > from people with whom you have no trust relationship. They could
> > be feeding you utter garbage and you'd never know.
> Yeah, that's the primary problem with what I was talking about. As I
> said. The reason I posted about it. I think it might be possible to
> get useful data out of it. It would probably be challenging.
> Which is precisely why I feel it is absolutely necessary to prevent
> the sender IP forging which UDP allows.
That's ludicrous. Our system ties a report to a specific user.
How does tying it to a specific IP address improve security?
> So if I just open a socket, dump over the IP, whether it's ham or
> spam, and maybe a protocol version, it just won't work huh?
Go ahead and try it. I agree that there's no point in building on
the work of others; that's not for 1337 H4x0rs.
> That RFC is a great checklist. But I really don't see a reason to
> conform to it.
Sure, whatever. NIH run amuck, I guess.
> I expect scaling to be much more of an issue with your reputation
> system than the free system I've been talking about.
That's crazy. We restrict the number of people who can report to our
customers and a handful of people we trust. You're planning on making
it "Free. Unrestricted." So scaling will be a HUGE issue for you.
> And if I'm wrong, I hope others will donate server resources. As
> has happened with similar projects.
Heh! :-) Way to plan for scalability... throw hardware (that you don't own)
at the problem. :)
(Btw, why do you think DCC uses UDP for its reports?)
> Also, sender IP forging.
Sender IP forging is a red herring. We have an authenticated user name.
That's far stronger authentication than knowing an IP address.
Also, there are simple countermeasures to detect if a sender's credentials
have been stolen and data is spewing from many faked IP addresses. It's
easy enough to spot anomalies.
> > Remember, our system is designed to scale to tens or hundreds of
> > thousands of reporting systems sending tens or hundreds of
> > thousands of reports per second.
> That's great. And not what I expect to do.
Well then... what exactly DO you expect to do?